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ABSTRACT. A lot of research has recently been done on the topic of ground, and in
particular on the logic of ground. According to a broad consensus in that debate, ground
is hyperintensional in the sense that even logically equivalent truths may differ with re-
spect to what grounds them, and what they ground. This renders pressing the question
of what we may take to be the ground-theoretic content of a true statement, i.e. that
aspect of the statement’s overall content to which ground is sensitive. I propose a novel
answer to this question, namely that ground tracks how, rather than just by what, a
statement is made true. I develop that answer in the form of a formal theory of ground-
theoretic content, show how the resulting framework may be used to articulate theories
of ground, including in particular an attractive account of the grounds of truthfunction-
ally complex truths that has proved difficult to accommodate on alternative views of
content.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recently a lot of research has been devoted to ground – the relation, as Kit Fine has
put it, ‘of one truth holding in virtue of others’ (Fine, 2012c: p. 1) – and in particular
to the broadly logical features of ground.1 A distinctive feature of ground, according to
current consensus, is that it is hyperintensional in the sense that even logically equiv-
alent truths may differ with respect to what grounds them and what they ground (cf.
(Correia and Schnieder, 2012: p. 14)). For instance, the truth that snow is white is
taken to ground the truth that snow is white or snow is not white, but not the logically
equivalent truth that grass is green or grass is not green. And the truth that snow is white
or snow is not white in turn grounds the truth obtained by adding as a further disjunct
1 The pioneering contributions initiating this debate were Batchelor (2010); Correia (2010, 2014a);
Fine (2010, 2012c,b); Rosen (2010); Schnieder (2011). More recent work includes Correia (2014b);
deRosset (2013, 2014); Krämer (2013); Krämer and Roski (2015); Krämer and Roski (2016); Litland
(2013, 2016a); Poggiolesi (2015).
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the proposition that 2+2=5, which is not grounded by the logically equivalent truth that
grass is green or grass is not green.
Ground is accordingly sensitive to features of a truth that go beyond its logical pro-
file, and in particular beyond the matter of what possible worlds the truth obtains in.
One pressing question in the development of the theory of ground is therefore just what
the features of a truth are that are tracked by ground. For once we have an answer to
this question, we may form a notion of a ground-theoretic content by abstracting from
those features of a truth to which ground is blind. We can then go on to construct a
mathematical representation of ground-theoretic content, which may serve as a com-
mon framework within which to formally articulate, study, and compare the various
competing views of ground.
In this paper I propose and defend a particular answer to the question what ground is
sensitive to. My proposal builds on, and modifies, the view implicit in the semantics of
ground that Fine has developed in his influential papers ‘The Pure Logic of Ground’ and
‘Guide to Ground’ (Fine, 2012c,b). Central to this view is the notion of a fact – roughly,
a proper or improper part of the actual world – verifying a truth. The view then presents
the relationship of ground as sensitive purely to mereological relationships between the
facts that verify the relevant truths. Unfortunately, as Fine concedes, the view is limited
in its capability to serve as a framework for the articulation of plausible theories of
ground. For it cannot accommodate certain widely held principles about the interaction
of ground with the truth-functional operations of conjunction, disjunction, and negation.
I argue that we can overcome this problem by means of a very natural modification of
Fine’s approach. The key element of my proposal is the notion of a mode of verification,
which corresponds to a certain kind of answer to the question how a truth is verified by
a fact. A disjunction P∨Q, for example, may plausibly be verified either by verifying
its first disjunct P, or by verifying its second disjunct Q, and if P and Q are distinct
propositions, then these modes of verifying P∨Q will be distinct as well. I suggest that
it is these features of a truth, the modes in which it is verified, that ground tracks. In
particular, I take some truths P1,P2, . . . to ground a truth Q just in case Q is verified by
verifying P1,P2, . . .2
The plan for the paper is as follows. Section 2 clarifies and motivates the project of
the paper. Section 3 briefly describes Fine’s proposal and its limitations. In section 4 I
informally introduce the notion of a mode of verification. I go on to show how a plausi-
ble account of how conjunctions, disjunctions, and negations are verified combines with
2 A word on notation. I shall be somewhat sloppy in my use of the letters ‘P’, ‘Q’, etc., in that I
sometimes use them as schematic sentence letters, and sometimes as variables ranging over contents
that may be assigned to sentences.
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the proposed view of ground to validate the principles that Fine was unable to accommo-
date. This constitutes a partial vindication of my proposal. A long penultimate section 5
describes a mathematical representation of ground-theoretic content to serve as a formal
framework for developing the theory of ground. I then use the framework to define a
relation of ground and operations of conjunction, disjunction, and negation. The emerg-
ing view is again shown to validate the principles linking ground and the truth-functions
that are invalid on Fine’s account. Finally, I show how various competing views of
the structural principles of ground, as well as of ground-theoretic equivalence, may be
implemented within my formal framework. Section 6 concludes.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Following Fine, I have informally spoken of ground as a relation between truths. It is
controversial, however, whether this is the best, most perspicuous, or most fundamental
way of speaking about ground. There are two worries about this, one targeting the term
‘relation’, one concerning the term ‘truths’. I discuss them in turn.
A number of authors prefer to use a sentential operator to express ground, rather
than a relational predicate such as ‘ground(s)’.3 Using < as the symbol for ground, they
would therefore write ‘the ball is round < the ball is red or round’ rather than ‘the truth
that the ball is round grounds the truth that the ball is red or round’. Speaking in this
way, it may be argued, no more commits one to a relation of ground holding between
some truths than the use of ‘if and only if’ commits one to a relation of equivalence
holding between some propositions.
However, even on this view, it is highly desirable to have a theory of ground-theoretic
content of the kind I am after. Let it be granted that there is a legitimate notion of the
overall content of a sentence. Then we may ask with respect to this notion which of the
features of a sentence’s content the grounding operator< is sensitive to in the sense that
sameness with respect to these features of content guarantees that two sentences may
replace one another within the scope of<without changing the truth value.4 Abstracting
3 The operator option is chosen, for example, by Fine (2012b), Correia (2010), and Schnieder (2011).
The predicate option is preferred by Rosen (2010), as well as Schaffer (2009). (The latter is something
of an outlier in the current debate, though, in that he takes ground to relate not just truths, but objects
of any kind. His conception of ground will not be canvassed in this paper.)
4 I assume here that ground is sensitive only to differences between sentences that concern content.
This is not obvious prior to investigation; it may be that the best account of the distinctions drawn by
ground sees (some of) them as purely syntactic. For the purposes of this paper, the assumption has the
status of a working hypothesis. That is, I propose that we try and see if we can make sufficiently fine-
grained distinctions pertaining to content to capture the distinctions drawn by ground. (One potentially
problematic kind of case arises in connection with conceptual analyses. It might be suggested that if
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again from any other features of a sentence’s content, we get our notion of ground-
theoretic content. The ground-theoretic content of a sentence will then be exactly what
is suited to play the role of a sentence’s semantic value in formulating a semantics for
ground. A formal framework within which to theorize about ground-theoretic content
thus provides a framework for the development of semantic theories of ground.
We turn to the second worry concerning the talk of ground as a relation between
truths, targeting the use of the term ‘truth’. A truth, presumably, is some kind of (ac-
curate) representation of the world, and so ground, if it is a relation between truths,
would appear to be a meta-representational relation. A number of authors however pre-
fer to see ground as a relation between worldly items rather than representational ones,
for which the term ‘fact’ would then appear more appropriate than ‘truth’ (cf. Correia
(2010: p. 258f)). An alternative option, preferred by Correia in later work, is to simply
distinguish two legitimate notions of ground, one worldly, one representational (cf. his
2014a: sec. 5 and 2014b: p. 36).5 I myself do not find the worldly/representational dis-
tinction very helpful or clear. It should be noted, though, that nothing in the way I have
introduced the notion of ground-theoretic content hinges on the use of the term ‘truth’
rather than ‘fact’, or on taking the relata of ground to be representational entities.6 So
even if the only legitimate notion of ground is somehow worldly, this by itself threatens
neither interest nor feasibility of my project.
A clearer distinction than that between worldly and representational items obtains be-
tween two alternative kinds of views on the logical principles for ground which Correia
takes to be characteristic of worldly and representational conceptions of ground. On one
Alice is a vixen, say, then this is so because Alice is a female fox, where the ‘because’ indicates
grounding, and that nevertheless ‘Alice is a vixen’ and ‘Alice is a female fox’ are exactly alike in
content. For discussion, see (Schnieder, 2010). Thanks to an anonymous referee for highlighting the
relevance of these cases.)
5 Note that the distinction, if it can be made, may also be transposed to the sentential-operator setting,
where it turns into a distinction between worldly and representational conceptions of ground-theoretic
content; cf. (Correia, 2010: 257).
6 It may be objected that I treat ground, in effect, as a relation between ground-theoretic contents,
and since contents are representational entities, this commits me to a representational conception of
ground. If this were so, the same reasoning would reveal Correia’s ostensively worldly conception
of ground as representational, for he, too, treats ground in effect as a relation between what he calls
the worldly contents of sentences. In his intended sense, then, a content may be worldly and thus
non-representational. This is one of the reasons why I do not find this way of making the distinction
very helpful.
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kind of view, the following introduction principles for ground are taken to hold without
restriction:7
(<I∨): If P then P< P∨Q and P< Q∨P
(<I∧): If P, Q then P, Q< P∧Q
(<I¬∧): If ¬P then ¬P< ¬(P∧Q) and ¬P< ¬(Q∧P)
(<I¬∨): If ¬P, ¬Q then ¬P,¬Q< ¬(P∨Q)
(<I¬¬): If P then P< ¬¬P
Now on all of the extant logics of ground, typical instances of the first four of these
principles are taken to hold. But opinions diverge with respect to some special kinds of
instances. Consider in particular the case in which P = Q. If the principles hold even
for this case, then for any truth or fact P, we have that P grounds P∨P as well as that P
grounds P∧P. Given the standard assumption that ground is not generally reflexive, it
follows that a distinction must be made between P on the one hand, and P∨P as well as
P∧P on the other hand. But such a distinction, Correia claims, is only plausible given
a conception of the relata of ground as representational entities, and he takes the same
view with respect to the distinction required by the last principle between a truth P and
its double negation ¬¬P. On a worldly conception of ground, he concludes, (<I¬¬) is
to be rejected, and the other principles have to be restricted to rule out, at least, the case
of P = Q.8
So let us set aside the worldly/representational distinction and instead focus directly
on the introduction principles. Should we take them to hold in unrestricted form? Or
should they be restricted in some way? Or does it simply depend on which of two
equally legitimate notions of ground is at issue? Rather than try to decide the issue in
advance of developing a theory of ground-theoretic content, I suggest that well-founded
answers should be based in part on how the possible views can be implemented within
such a theory. And so the question arises whether each view can be accommodated
within an attractive theory of ground-theoretic content.
A partial answer to this question is contained in Fine’s work, which provides us with
an elegant theory of ground-theoretic content that naturally accommodates the view that
the introduction principles should be restricted. For on that account and given Fine’s
definition of ground, certain relatively natural restrictions of the introduction principles
7 This kind of view is endorsed, for example, by Fine (2012b), and in related forms by Rosen (2010),
Schnieder (2011), and Correia (2014b).
8 Cf. (Correia, 2010: p. 267f) – It is plausible that a number of other cases should then also be
disallowed; cf. ibid, p. 269.
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turn out to hold. The question is then whether it is also possible to formulate an al-
ternative account that equally naturally accommodates the view that the introduction
principles should not be restricted; as Fine himself points out, his own account can-
not serve in this role. My aim in what follows is therefore to develop such a theory
of ground-theoretic content and thereby to establish a positive answer to this second
question.
3. THE TRUTHMAKER CONCEPTION OF CONTENT
Fine (2012b) formulates a semantics for ground, and implicit in that semantics is,
firstly, an answer to the question to what features of a sentence’s content ground is
sensitive, and secondly, a theory of ground-theoretic content. This section briefly sum-
marizes Fine’s account and identifies its limitations hinted at above.
The semantics Fine proposes associates with each sentence A two sets of facts, namely
the set [A]+ of facts verifying the sentence and the set of facts [A]− falsifying the sen-
tence. Facts are described by Fine in comparison with possible worlds: they are like
possible worlds except in that they are all of them actual, and in that they are generally
incomplete in the sense that they leave open the truth-value of some propositions. More-
over, it is assumed that facts may be fused, so that given any facts s, t, u, . . ., we may
form their fusion
⊔{s, t, u, . . .}= sunionsq tunionsquunionsq . . ., which contains all of s, t, u as parts. For
a sentence to be true is for it to be verified by some fact, and for it to be false is for it
to be falsified by some fact. So if we assume that no sentence is both true and false and
no sentence is neither true nor false, then for every sentence A, exactly one of [A]+ and
[A]− is empty.
A content P, on this view, may accordingly be identified with a pair 〈P+,P−〉 of two
sets of facts, where any member of P+ is a verifier of P, and any member of P− is a
falsifier of P. Fine assumes that any fusion of verifiers of a sentence also verifies the
sentence and similarly for falsifiers. So both components of a content are required to be
closed under fusion.
Fine then formulates semantic clauses for four distinct grounding operators; the cor-
responding relations on contents may be defined as follows:9
P1, P2, . . .≤ Q iff s1unionsq s2unionsq . . . ∈ Q+ whenever s1 ∈ P+1 , s2 ∈ P+2 , . . .
P Q iff P, R1, R2, . . .≤ Q for some R1, R2, . . .
P1, P2, . . . < Q iff P1, P2, . . .≤ Q and Q 6 P1, Q 6 P2, . . .
P≺ Q iff P Q and Q 6 P
9 Although Fine does not say so, the definitions should be read as restricted to truths, otherwise
P1,P2, . . .≤ Q will vacuously hold whenever one of P1,P2, . . . is false.
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Somewhat curiously, the most basic notion of ground of the four is not the familiar
notion of ground but a reflexive notion that Fine calls weak full ground (≤). In terms of
this notion and its natural partial counterpart (), Fine then defines an irreflexive notion
of strict full ground (<), as well as a notion of strict partial ground (≺).
Weak full ground, and thereby ultimately all notions of ground, is defined essentially
in terms of the notion of fusion and verification. Ground, on this picture, is thus taken
to track mereological relationships between the facts verifying the relevant truths, and
ground-theoretic content is accordingly taken to be a matter of which facts verify a given
truth.
Given this view of ground-theoretic content, however, it does not appear possible
to accommodate the unrestricted introduction principles. To see this, we need to ask
how the operations of conjunction, disjunction, and negation may be defined on Fine’s
contents. The view adopted in Fine (2012b) corresponds to these definitions:
(P∧Q)+ = {sunionsq t : s ∈ P+ and t ∈ Q+}
(P∧Q)− = P−∪Q−∪{sunionsq t : s ∈ P− and t ∈ Q−}
(P∨Q)+ = P+∪Q+∪{sunionsq t : s ∈ P+ and t ∈ Q+}
(P∨Q)− = {sunionsq t : s ∈ P− and t ∈ Q−}
(¬P)+ = P−
(¬P)− = P+
But this implies that for all P, P = P∧P = P∨P = ¬¬P, and accordingly we never
have P< P∧P, P< P∨P, or P<¬¬P. Moreover, even independently of these specific
clauses, it is hard to see how the problem could be solved within the present framework.
For there appears to be no plausible way to distinguish between a truth P on the one hand
and the corresponding truths P∨P, P∧P, or ¬¬P on the other hand, appealing only to
the facts verifying them, and in such a way as to generally render the relevant grounding
claims true. The most obvious way to allow for some sort of distinction between P and
P∨P as well as P∧P would be to lift the requirement that P be closed under fusion.
But this would not help for the case of ¬¬P, and even for P∧P and P∨P, it would
of course help only in the special case where P is not closed under fusion. If we wish
to accommodate the envisaged introduction principles in unrestricted form, we need to
modify the Finean framework.10
10 Note that I am relying here on the assumption, noted in footnote 4 above, that ground is sensitive
only to differences in content. If this assumption were given up, and ground seen as sensitive to the
linguistic guises of contents, then the above line of reasoning could be resisted. Thanks here to an
anonymous referee.
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4. INTRODUCING MODES OF VERIFICATION
To see how a suitable conception of ground-theoretic content might be obtained, we
adopt for the moment an informal understanding of propositions and ask what distinc-
tions we can then draw between a proposition P and the corresponding disjunction P∨P
that might be tracked by the relation of ground.
Consider first the easier case of the disjunction P∨Q of the distinct propositions P
that Alice is smart and Q that Bob is tall. Suppose the fact s of Alice having an IQ
of 150 verifies P and the fact t that Bob is 6 foot tall verifies Q. Then both s and t
separately verify P∨Q. But it seems natural to think that there is a difference between
the verification of P∨Q by s and the verification of P∨Q by t, which we can bring out
by asking how the facts verify the proposition. The fact s verifies the proposition P∨Q
by verifying the disjunct P that Alice is smart. The fact t, in contrast, verifies P∨Q by
verifying its other disjunct Q that Bob is tall.
Thus attending to the ways, or modes in which a proposition is verified by its verifiers,
also enables us to distinguish between P and P∨P. For it is very natural to say that s
verifies P∨P just as it verifies P∨Q, by verifying P. At the same time, it is not at all
tempting to say that s verifies P itself by verifying P. I would suggest, moreover, that
it is this distinction which is tracked by the grounding relation. Roughly speaking, P
grounds P∨P precisely because P∨P may be verified by verifying P, whereas P does
not ground P, since P may not be verified by verifying P.
Before we move on to consider the case of conjunction, a brief comment on my use
of ‘by’ is required to avoid misunderstanding. As used in ordinary language, a ‘by’-
statement can be true even if it provides only a partial answer to the corresponding
‘how’-question. For instance, we may say that someone got into the house by breaking
a window without thereby implying that breaking the window was on its own sufficient
for the person to get into the house. Even if it was also required that the person climb
through the window, the ‘by’-statement may express a truth by ordinary language stan-
dards. I wish to highlight, therefore, that the uses of ‘by’ I make in the formulation
of my proposal, in contrast, are to be understood as imposing the kind of fullness or
sufficiency condition that is lacking in the ordinary reading of ‘by’.11
We turn now to the case of P and P∧P. Again, we first consider the easier case of the
conjunction P∧Q of the distinct propositions P and Q. Since s verifies P and t verifies Q,
their fusion sunionsq t verifies P∧Q. But how does sunionsq t verify P∧Q? A natural first thought
is: by verifying P and Q. However, on the perhaps most natural, distributive reading
11 Cf. (Schnieder, 2008: p. 665f.). As Schnieder points out elsewhere (2011: 450f), similar cautionary
remarks are in order when locutions such as ‘because’ are used to convey relationships of full ground.
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of that suggestion, it implies that sunionsq t verifies each of these two propositions. And this
is typically not the case, for on the Finean view, a verifier of a conjunction does not in
general verify each, or even just one of the conjuncts.12 The difficulty can be resolved
by employing a non-distributive interpretation of the claim that the propositions P and
Q are verified by a fact like sunionsqt.13 The idea is that in the relevant sense, the propositions
P1, P2, . . . are verified by a fact iff the fact is the fusion of some facts s1, s2, . . . verifying
P1, P2, . . . respectively. Since s, t verify P and Q, respectively, their fusion sunionsq t verifies,
in the non-distributive sense, P and Q. Moreover, I claim that it is by verifying P and Q
that sunionsq t verifies P∧Q.14
So by taking into account the modes in which a proposition is verified, we are also
able to distinguish between P and P∧P. For while s verifies P∧P by verifying P, it is
not the case that s verifies P by verifying P. And as before, P may be taken to ground
P∧P on the strength of the fact P∧P may be verified by verifying P, whereas P does
not ground P, since P may not be verified by verifying P. More generally, the account
of ground I propose may in a first approximation be stated thus:
(<): Q1, Q2, . . . < P iff
(i) P, Q1, Q2, . . . are true, and
(ii) every verifier of Q1, Q2, . . . verifies P by verifying Q1, Q2, . . .
Consider now finally the negative proposition ¬Q that it is not the case that Bob is
tall. How should we take it to be verified? Like Fine, I adopt a bilateral conception
of content to account for negation. On this conception, a content encodes information
concerning both how it is verified and how it is falsified. So in giving an account of
¬Q, we may appeal to both what verifies its negatum Q, and what falsifies it. Again
with Fine, I take it that ¬Q is verified by exactly those facts that falsify Q, and that ¬Q
12 This illustrates that Fine’s notion of verification is non-monotonic in the sense that a fact may fail to
verify a proposition even though it has a part which verifies the proposition. For this reason, Fine
sometimes describes this notion of verification, which he also calls exact verification, as imposing a
requirement of holistic relevance: for a fact to verify a given proposition, it must not contain any part
which is irrelevant to the truth of the proposition (cf. his 2012a: p. 234 and 2014: p. 551f et passim).
13 The non-distributive notion of verification has also been put to use in (Litland, 2016b) in developing
a logic of a many-many notion of grounding, on which what is grounded is irreducibly a collection of
truths or facts.
14 The case of conjunction makes especially clear why the ‘full’ interpretation of ‘by’ must be assumed.
For suppose that every fact s that verifies P also verifies Q and therefore P∧Q. By ordinary standards,
it might then be true to say that every verifier s of P verifies P∧Q by (among other things) verifying
P. But it would not therefore be true to say that P < P∧Q. We avoid this result if we read ‘by’ as
requiring fullness. For on such a reading, it is false that in general every verifier of P verifies P∧Q
by verifying P, since verifying P is usually only part of what is required for verifying P∧Q.
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is falsified by exactly those facts that verify Q. For instance, the fact t ′ that Bob is 5
foot tall would plausibly falsify the proposition Q that Bob is tall, and hence verify ¬Q,
whereas the fact t that Bob is 6 foot tall verifies Q, and therefore falsifies ¬Q.
We use again the +/−-notation to talk about bilateral contents and their components.
That is, for P a bilateral content, P+ is the positive component of P, and P− is the
negative component, so that P = 〈P+,P−〉. The notion of verification is applied with
harmless ambiguity to both bilateral contents and their (unilateral) positive and negative
components. Verification of a bilateral content P is defined as verification of P+, and
falsification of P as verification of P−.
In giving an account of negation, I now need to say how a negation is verified by its
verifiers, and falsified by its falsifiers. For each of these questions, two views are prima
facie possible. I call them the by-view and the identity-view, respectively. So we have to
consider four views with respect to ¬P:
(BV): The by-view of verification: ¬P is verified by falsifying P.
(BF): The by-view of falsification: ¬P is falsified by verifying P.
(IV): The identity-view of verification: ¬P is verified how P is falsified.
(IF): The identity-view of falsification: ¬P is falsified how P is verified.
For example, according to (BV), the fact t ′ would verify the proposition ¬Q that Bob
is not tall by falsifying its negatum Q, the proposition that Bob is tall. More generally,
any fact verifying Q−, by verifying Q−, verifies (¬Q)+. And according to (BF), the
state t that Bob is 6 foot tall falsifies ¬Q by verifying Q. More generally, any verifier
of Q+, by verifying Q+, verifies (¬Q)−. According to (IV), in contrast, ¬Q is verified
in exactly the ways Q is falsified, so that (¬Q)+ = Q−. And on (IF), ¬Q is falsified in
exactly the ways Q is verified, so (¬Q)− = Q+.
In principle, any view of verification can be consistently combined with any view
of falsification, so we obtain a total of four possible views of how the bilateral content
of a negation is determined: (BV+BF), (BV+IF), (IV+BF), and (IV+IF). Some of the
views do not fit our desired principles for ground, though. Firstly, if we are to obtain
that P < ¬¬P, then it must hold that the double negation ¬¬P of a given content P
may be verified by verifying P. But this rules out (IV+IF), since that view implies
P = ¬¬P. (IV+BF) and (BV+IF), in contrast, directly imply this result. For assume
that s verifies P+. Suppose we accept (BV+IF). By (IF), (¬P)− = P+, so s verifies
(¬P)− in whatever ways it verifies P+. By (BV), it follows that s verifies (¬¬P)+
by verifying (¬P)− = P+. But that just means that s verifies ¬¬P by verifying P, as
desired. Now consider (IV+BF). By (BF), s verifies (¬P)− by verifying P+. By (IV),
TOWARDS A THEORY OF GROUND-THEORETIC CONTENT 11
(¬¬P)+ = (¬P)−, so it follows that s verifies (¬¬P)+ by verifying P+, and thus s
verifies ¬¬P by verifying P, as desired.
The situation is more complicated in the case of (BV+BF). Assume s verifies P+.
Then by (BF), s verifies (¬P)− by verifying P+. Moreover, by (BV), s verifies (¬¬P)+
by verifying (¬P)−. Now, nothing we have said so far allows us to conclude that s
verifies (¬¬P)+ by verifying P+. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that ‘by’, at least in
its pertinent ‘full’ use, is transitive in the sense that if s ϕs by ψing, and ψs by χing,
then s ϕs by χing. If so, then we may still infer that s verifies (¬¬P)+ by verifying P+.
So it seems that all three remaining views will yield the desired mode of verification for
the double negation ¬¬P, and correspondingly that P< ¬¬P.
The differences between the views emerge more clearly with respect to the other kinds
of negative propositions, namely negations of conjunctions and disjunctions. Recall the
above introduction principles for ground governing these:
(<I¬∧): If ¬P then ¬P< ¬(P∧Q) and ¬P< ¬(Q∧P)
(<I¬∨): If ¬P,¬Q, then ¬P,¬Q< ¬(P∨Q)
If we are to accommodate them, we must have that ¬(P∧Q) may be verified by verify-
ing ¬P and by verifying ¬Q, and that ¬(P∨Q) may be verified by verifying ¬P, ¬Q. It
turns out that this demand favours (IV+BF), the combination of the identity-view of the
verification of a negation with the by-view of its falsification.
To see this, we first need to look at how conjunctions and disjunctions are falsified.
Note that on the truthmaker conception, there is a strong analogy between the falsifi-
cation of conjunctions and the verification of disjunctions, as well as between the fal-
sification of disjunctions and the verification of conjunctions. Specifically, the negative
content of a conjunction relates to the negative contents of its conjuncts like the positive
content of a disjunction relates to the positive contents of its disjuncts. And similarly,
the negative content of a disjunction relates to the negative contents of its disjuncts like
the positive content of a conjunction relates to the positive contents of its conjuncts. It is
natural to continue the analogy from the case of what verifies or falsifies to how it does
so. In particular, just as (P∨Q)+ is verified via P+ and via Q+, we shall take (P∧Q)−
to be verified via P− and via Q−, and just as (P∧Q)+ is verified via P+, Q+, we shall
take (P∨Q)− to be verified via P−, Q−.
Now consider the claim that every verifier of ¬P, by verifying ¬P, verifies ¬(P∧Q).
First, we show that (IV+BF) implies this claim. Assume that s verifies ¬P. Then s
verifies P−, and so verifies (P∧Q)− by verifying P−. By (IV), (¬(P∧Q))+= (P∧Q)−,
so it follows that s verifies (¬(P∧Q))+ by verifying P−. Moreover, we have P− =
(¬P)+, so it follows that s verifies (¬(P∧Q))+ by verifying (¬P)+, as desired. But
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now consider (BV+IF). If s verifies (¬P)+, then s verifies P−, so s verifies (P∧Q)−
via P−. Given (BV), we have that s verifies (¬(P∧Q))+ via (P∧Q)−. Assuming
transitivity, we could infer that s verifies (¬(P∧Q))+ via P−, but without the identity
of P− and (¬P)+, there is no way we can then obtain the conclusion that s verifies
(¬(P∧Q))+ via (¬P)+. Moreover, as this case does not involve the falsification of any
negation, the situation is exactly the same for (BV+BF).
To validate all of the desired introduction principles for ground, we therefore have
to accept (IV+BF) as our account of negation. This account is striking in embodying
an asymmetric view of negation. It distinguishes between the falsification of a negation
and the verification of the negatum, but not between the verification of a negation and
the falsification of the negatum. In other words, the view is that to falsify a content
is to verify its negation, whereas it is not the case that to verify a content is to falsify
its negation. Rather, falsifying the negation is something achieved through, but distinct
from, the verification of the negatum.15
5. A MODE-IFIED TRUTHMAKER THEORY OF CONTENT
On the view I have proposed, the features of a truth to which ground is sensitive are
features concerning what facts verify the truth and how, i.e. in what modes they do so.
We therefore have to encode in (a mathematical representation of) a proposition both
what facts verify or falsify it as well as in what modes they do so. The obvious idea is to
replace the sets of facts in Fine’s account by sets of pairs 〈s, m〉 of a fact s and a mode
15 That this kind of asymmetric account should be accepted is a surprising result; independently of
the connection to the introduction principles, it might have seemed more natural to endorse one of the
symmetric accounts. So the question arises whether there might be independent philosophical reasons
for endorsing the asymmetric account. Although the matter calls for a much more extended discussion
than I can offer here, it may be worth mentioning one possible source of independent motivation. I
have in mind the kind of asymmetric account of truth and falsity that is endorsed, for example, by
Williamson (1994: p. 188), which can be captured by the following principles:
(T): If a proposition says that P, then it is true iff P.
(F): If a proposition says that P, then it is false iff ¬P.
This account immediately ties both the truth of a proposition saying that ¬P and the falsity of a
proposition saying that P to the same thing: it being the case that ¬P. But it does not in the same
way tie the falsity of a proposition saying that ¬P and the truth of a proposition saying that P to the
same thing. Rather, the first is tied, in the first instance, to it being the case that ¬¬P, and the second
to it being the case that P. This asymmetry is at least strongly reminiscent of the identification of the
falsification of P with the verification of ¬P, in the absence of the identification of the verification of
P with the falsification of ¬P. As such, it may perhaps provide an independent basis for the latter.
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m. The presence of 〈s, m〉 in P+ (P−) would then be taken to represent that s verifies
(falsifies) P in mode m. The limiting case of a state verifying a proposition directly, as
it were, i.e. not by verifying any propositions, may be represented by means of a special
mode m0 of directness. Any indirect mode m would be identified by the propositions
P1, P2, . . . in the verification of which it consists. The truths P1, P2, . . . would be taken
to ground a truth Q just in case for every fact s verifying P1, P2, . . ., when m is the mode
corresponding to P1, P2, . . ., 〈s, m〉 is a member of Q.
I shall however deviate from this proposal in two ways. Firstly, it turns out that
given our account of ground, we can work with a significantly simpler construction
than the one just described: we may replace Fine’s sets of facts simply with sets of
modes, counting facts as special, direct modes of verification.16 The presence of a fact
s in P+ represents that s verifies P directly, and the presence of an (indirect) mode m
in P+ represents that P is verified in mode m, by every fact verifying the propositions
Q1, Q2, . . . corresponding to m. We may then take the propositions P1, P2, . . . to ground
a proposition Q just in case there is a mode of verification corresponding to P1, P2, . . .,
and it is a member of Q. It is straightforward to show that the relation of ground holds
according to the latter, simpler picture just in case it holds between the corresponding
contents on the former, more complicated picture.
The second deviation is motivated by a desire to accommodate a non-factive un-
derstanding of ground. Roughly speaking, some propositions P1, P2, . . . non-factively
ground a proposition Q iff they satisfy the conditions to ground Q, bar perhaps the con-
dition of being true. This means in particular that non-factive ground satisfies uncondi-
tional versions of the introduction principles stated above, so that for example P< P∨Q
holds irrespective of whether P or Q are true.17 To characterize non-factive ground, we
move to a similarly non-factive conception of indirect modes of verification.18 Mainly,
16 The possibility of this simplification was suggested to me by [removed for blind review].
17 On the idea of a non-factive notion of ground, cf. e.g. (Fine, 2012b: 48ff), and (Correia, 2014b: p.
36).
18 A similar move may be considered for the direct modes. Specifically, we may follow Fine (cf. 2014:
557f; 2016: p. 8), and replace the appeal to the notion of a fact by an appeal to a broader notion of
a state, which is like that of a fact except in that a state need not be actual, and indeed need not even
be possible. There is then no obstacle to assuming every proposition to have at least one verifier and
at least one falsifier. However, since ground, on my account, is determined purely by the presence or
absence of indirect modes in a given proposition, this extension of the conception of verifiers is not
required for our construction to work as intended. To the extent that non-actual and impossible modes
are less problematic than non-actual and impossible states, it is an advantage of my framework that
it can accommodate non-factive ground using less worrisome resources than are required on Fine’s
approach. (It should be noted, though, that if we do not allow non-actual and impossible states, then
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this means that we do not demand that the propositions P1, P2, . . . be true if they are
to correspond to a mode of verification. We may then include in P∨Q the mode of
verifying via P, irrespective of whether P is true. We can then say that P non-factively
grounds P∨Q on the strength of the fact that P∨Q contains the mode of verifying via
P. Given a suitable selection of modes as actual, we may then count a proposition true
just in case one of its modes is actual, and factive ground may be defined in the natural
way in terms of truth and non-factive ground. For simplicity, I shall henceforth focus
exclusively on non-factive ground.
Our first task will be to describe the basic behaviour of modes, this is done in 5.1.
Section 5.2 defines notions of ground on our contents, and in 5.3 I then define suitable
notions of conjunction, disjunction, and negation, which are shown to relate to ground in
the desired way. Section 5.4 identifies the constraints on our ground-theoretic contents
corresponding to the structural features ground is sometimes taken to possess. In 5.5 I
turn to the matter of the identity conditions on modes, and explain how they bear on the
question of equivalence in ground-theoretic content.
5.1. Modes. We shall begin by describing the basic behaviour of modes, leaving open
their exact nature and identity.
Firstly, any mode is either direct, which is to say that it is a fact, or it is indirect,
which is to say that there is some list of propositions P1, P2, . . . such that m is the mode
of verifying via P1, P2, . . .. We will also call direct modes fundamental, and indirect
ones derivative. Given our informal account of the previous section, it is clear that some
lists of propositions determine a mode, i.e. that there are some derivative modes. For
instance, the verifiers of the conjunction P∧Q of truths P, Q verify the conjunction by
verifying P, Q. So there is a mode of verification corresponding to the list of propositions
P, Q.
There appears to be no motivation, intuitive or theoretical, for allowing distinct modes
to correspond to the same list of propositions. The mathematical structure correspond-
ing to a list is a sequence, so we may take there to be a function mapping certain se-
quences of propositions to modes. We shall write this function V , alluding to the fact
that the mode in question will be the mode of verifing via the relevant list of proposi-
tions. So when 〈P1, P2, . . .〉 is a suitable sequence of propositions, V 〈P1, P2, . . .〉 is the
mode of verifying via P1, P2, . . ..
the presence of a mode m in a proposition P does not in general represent exactly that every verifier
of the propositions corresponding to m thereby verifies P. For the latter condition will be vacuously
satisfied for any non-actual mode. The presence of m in P should then simply be understood to
represent that verifying the propositions corresponding to m is a way to verify P – though it may be
logically impossible to verify P in this way.)
TOWARDS A THEORY OF GROUND-THEORETIC CONTENT 15
The basic structure that we will work with is a mode-space, which is a pair 〈M,V 〉 of
a non-empty set of modes M, and a via-function V . A maximally liberal conception of
propositions is obtained as follows. We call any subset P of M a unilateral proposition,
which is verified in exactly the modes which are its members. And we call any pair
P = 〈P+, P−〉 of unilateral propositions a bilateral proposition, which is verified in
exactly the modes that are members of P+, and falsified in exactly the modes that are
members of P−. (Here and in what follows, I mark the unilateral/bilateral distinction
typographically by using boldface variables for bilateral propositions.) For now, we
may focus on unilateral propositions.
The function V is assumed to be a mapping from some set of sequences of propo-
sitions into M. It is not required that V be defined for every sequence of propositions,
or even that it be defined for every singleton sequence 〈P〉 with P a proposition. In-
formally, that V is defined for some sequence of propositions 〈P1,P2, . . .〉 means that
there is such a thing as doing something by verifying P1,P2, . . . Correspondingly, if V
is undefined for 〈P1,P2, . . .〉, this means that there is no such thing as doing something
by verifying P1,P2, . . . One reason for not requiring that V be defined for all sequences
of propositions is that such a requirement would be inconsistent with a view of ground
as irreflexive. To see this, note that M is itself a proposition, so V 〈P〉 should have to
be defined for P = M. But then V 〈P〉 would have to a member of P, which is to say
that verifying P is a way to verify P. Given the proposed account of ground in terms of
modes of verification, it would follow that P grounds itself.
We shall however take for granted that two natural closure principles hold for the
range of sequences on which V is defined. Firstly, if V is defined for a given sequence
〈P1, P2, . . .〉 then it is also defined for any non-empty subsequence. Secondly, if V is de-
fined for each of the sequences γ1, γ2, . . ., then V is also defined for their concatenation
γ1_γ2_ . . ..19 For simplicity, we require that V be undefined for the empty sequence
〈〉.20
19 For present purposes, we may restrict attention to concatenations of an at most countable sequence of
sequences.
20 There may be purposes for which a putative ‘nullmode’ corresponding to 〈〉 may be useful. If a mode
is counted actual iff all propositions in the corresponding sequence are true, then the nullmode would
automatically be actual and hence every proposition containing it trivially true. It would thereby have
a similar profile to the nullfact (or nullstate) in Fine’s framework, which is the fusion of the empty set
of facts (or states), and part of every fact (state). The most obvious application of the nullmode would
be to capture Fine’s idea that some truths may be zero-grounded, where this is supposed to be distinct
from being ungrounded; cf. (Fine, 2012b: p. 47f).
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Note that V is not required to be one-to-one, but is allowed to map different sequences
to the same mode. We shall assume that the property of determining the same mode
is preserved under concatenation of sequences. That is, if V (γ1) = V (δ1), V (γ2) =
V (δ2), . . ., then V (γ1_γ2_ . . .)=V (δ_1 δ
_
2 . . .). If m1 =V (γ1), m2 =V (γ2), . . ., we call
V (γ1_γ2_ . . .) a fusion of 〈m1, m2, . . .〉. Given the previous constraints, any sequence
of indirect modes 〈m1, m2, . . .〉 has a unique fusion which we denote by ⊔〈m1, m2, . . .〉
or m1unionsqm2unionsq . . .
Whenever m = V 〈P1, P2, . . .〉, we call the set {P1, P2, . . .} a ground-set of m, since
{P1, P2, . . .} will ground a proposition Q if m ∈ Q. A mode-space will be called con-
strained iff: if V maps two sequences 〈P1, P2, . . .〉 and 〈Q1, Q2, . . .〉 of propositions to
the same mode, then the corresponding sets {P1, P2, . . .} and {Q1, Q2, . . .} are identical.
In that case, any indirect mode m has a unique ground-set, which we denote by |m|. We
shall usually assume that we are working in a constrained mode-space.21
Having described what modes are like, it is natural to ask what modes are. In view
of their intimate relationship with sequences of propositions, an obvious suggestion is
that perhaps modes may simply be identified with these sequences. With respect to
a large variety of mode-spaces, such an identification may indeed be carried through.
There are, however, interesting sorts of mode-spaces for which this is not possible.
The basic point is that sequences of propositions are set-theoretic constructions from
propositions, and propositions themselves are set-theoretic constructions from modes.
As a result, if modes are identified with sequences of propositions, the relation of ground
will automatically inherit certain features of the membership-relation, in particular its
irreflexivity, its asymmetry, and its well-foundedness. So for any mode-spaces that
yield relationships of ground that violate these principles, the reduction of modes to
sequences, or other set-theoretic constructions, of propositions, cannot be carried out.
Whether a different useful kind of reduction is then possible, perhaps using non-well-
founded sets, is a question I shall leave for another occasion. At any rate, in devising
a framework for theorizing about ground, I believe we are well-advised first to try and
work out what sort of constraints different plausible theories of ground impose on the
modes and their structure. Once we understand this, we may return to the metaphysical
question of what sorts of things modes may be taken to be on the various views. For the
time being, we shall therefore adopt towards modes the stance that Fine adopts towards
facts or states, and simply take them as given.
21 It may be worth pointing out that for cardinality reasons, in a constrained mode-space, V will be
undefined for most sequences. Thanks here to an anonymous referee.
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5.2. Ground. We first define notions of (non-factive) ground for unilateral contents.
Given our informal account of strict full ground above, we may define < and its partial
cousin ≺ as follows. Let Γ be a non-empty set of (unilateral) contents and P and Q
(unilateral) contents. Then:
(<): Γ< P iff for some mode m ∈ P, Γ is a ground-set of m
(≺): P≺ Q iff ∆, P< Q for some set of propositions ∆
Note that in contrast to Fine’s account above, strict ground is given a direct definition in
terms of modes of verification, and not defined via a reflexive notion of weak ground.
Nevertheless, we shall later have use for such a notion, and for a partial version of it,
which we define as follows:
(≤): Γ≤ P iff Γ< P or Γ= {P} or ({P} ⊂ Γ and Γ\{P}< P)
(): P Q iff P = Q or P≺ Q
The following principles are straightforward consequences from these definitions:22
Identity(≤): P≤ P.
Subsumption(</≺): If Γ, P< Q then P≺ Q.
Subsumption(</≤): If Γ< Q then Γ≤ Q.
Subsumption(≤/): If Γ, P≤ Q then P Q.
Subsumption(≺/): If P≺ Q then P Q.
The only non-trivial case is Sub(≤/). But suppose Γ, P≤Q. There are three cases. (i)
Γ, P < Q. Then P ≺ Q and hence P  Q. (ii) Γ∪{P} = {Q}. Then P = Q and hence
P  Q. (iii) {Q} ⊂ Γ∪{P} and (Γ∪{P})\{Q} < Q. Then either P = Q and hence
again P Q, or P ∈ (Γ∪{P})\{Q}, and hence P≺ Q, and so P Q.
We might also have defined weak partial ground as the partial version of weak full
ground rather than, as we have done above, as a weak version of strict partial ground.
For given the other definitions, the condition that P ≺ Q or P = Q is equivalent to
the condition that for some ∆, we have ∆, P ≤ Q. The right-to-left direction was just
established. For the left-to-right direction, suppose first that P ≺ Q. Then for some ∆,
we have ∆, P < Q and hence ∆, P < Q. Suppose then that P = Q. Then P ≤ Q, and
hence again, for some ∆, we have ∆, P≤ Q.
The extension of the four notions of ground to bilateral contents is done in the sim-
plest possible way. For a non-empty set Γ of bilateral contents, let Γ+ = {P+ : P ∈ Γ}.
Then we define Γ < P by Γ+ < P+, and likewise in the other cases.
22 I borrow the labels from the corresponding inference rules in Fine (2012c)’s pure logic of ground. –
Here and in what follows, I adopt the familiar convention of writing Γ∪{Q} as Γ, Q as well as Γ∪∆
as Γ, ∆, and similarly in other cases.
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5.3. The Truth-Functional Operations. In this section I define truth-functional op-
erations on our ground-theoretic contents. They are shown to combine with the above
account of ground to yield an attractive account of the grounds of truth-functionally
complex contents, which includes the unrestricted introduction principles for ground.
We first define conjunction and disjunction for unilateral contents. We then extend these
operations to the case of bilateral contents and define an operation of negation. We then
establish general necessary and sufficient conditions for some propositions to ground
the various kinds of truth-functionally complex propositions.
Recall the informal account given in the previous section of how disjunctions, con-
junctions, and negations are verified. With respect to disjunction, we said that any veri-
fier of P verifies P∨Q by verifying P, and any verifier of Q verifies P∨Q by verifying
Q. And with respect to conjunction, we said that any fusion sunionsq t of verifiers s of P and t
of Q verifies P∧Q by verifying P, Q. It follows that given any disjunction P∨Q, V must
be defined for 〈P〉, and 〈Q〉, and P∨Q must include both V 〈P〉 and V 〈Q〉. Likewise for
any conjunction P∧Q, V must be defined for 〈P, Q〉, and P∧Q must include V 〈P, Q〉.
Plausibly, both conjunctions and disjunctions may also be verified in other ways.
Thus, suppose that P may be verified by verifying some propositions R1, R2, . . . Then it
is natural to hold that P∧Q may also be verified by verifying R1, R2, . . . , Q. Similarly,
if Q may be verified by verifying R1, R2, . . ., it is natural to say that P∧Q may also be
verified by verifying P, R1, R2, . . . And finally, if P and Q may be verified via R1, R2, . . .
and S1, S2, . . ., respectively, P∧Q may be verified via R1, R2, . . . , S1, S2, . . .
In the case of the disjunction P∨Q, it seems similarly plausible that it may be verified
not only via P and via Q, but also via R1,R2, . . . whenever either of P and Q may be so
verified. In addition, we shall suppose that every mode of verifying the conjunction
P∧Q is also automatically a mode of verifying P∨Q.23
We may usefully state this account of conjunction and disjunction more formally in
terms of three auxiliary operations on unilateral propositions. At certain key places, we
need to ensure that V is defined for 〈P〉. We shall say that a proposition P is raisable
exactly when this is the case. Then when P, Q are propositions including only derivative
modes, and when R is a raisable proposition:
(Df. unionsq): PunionsqQ := {munionsqn : m ∈ P and n ∈ Q}
(Df. +): P+Q := (P∪Q)∪ (PunionsqQ)
(Df. ↑): ↑R := {V 〈R〉}+{m ∈ R : m is derivative}
23 This parallels Fine’s account of the truthmakers of disjunctions which include not only the verifiers of
the disjuncts, but also any fusions of these.
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Note that there is a close correspondence between the operations unionsq and + on unilateral
contents and Fine’s operations of conjunction and disjunction, respectively. For the way
PunionsqQ is obtained from P and Q is exactly analogous to how, one Fine’s view, the positive
content of a conjunction is obtained from that of its conjuncts. Likewise the way P+Q
is obtained from P and Q is analogous to how, one Fine’s view, the positive content of
a disjunction is obtained from that of its disjuncts. On the present account, however,
conjunction and disjunction are defined in terms of these operations and the third one,
which I call raising. Its effect is to produce a proposition ↑P just like its argument P,
except that it may be verified via P, and via P, R1, R2, . . .whenever P may be verified via
R1, R2, . . .24 The following definitions of unilateral conjunction and disjunction accord
with our above account of what modes should be included in P∨Q and P∧Q. For
raisable propositions P, Q:
(Df. ∧U): P∧Q := ↑Punionsq ↑Q
(Df. ∨U): P∨Q := ↑P+ ↑Q
Given our informal discussion of negation in the previous section, it is immediate how
conjunction, disjunction, and negation are now to be defined on bilateral contents. For
pairs of raisable unilateral propositions P,Q:
(Df. ¬B): ¬P := 〈P−, ↑P+〉
(Df. ∧B): P∧Q := 〈P+∧Q+, P−∨Q−〉
(Df. ∨B): P∨Q := 〈P+∨Q+, P−∧Q−〉
Note how the definition of ¬ reflects the asymmetric view of negation.
24 Note that absent any assumptions to the effect that P cannot be verified in part by verifying P, there
is no guarantee that ↑P 6= P. – One might wonder whether an argument is not needed for the claim
that there always exists such a proposition as ↑P. Formally, the assumption that P is raisable, in
conjunction with the closure of the set of modes under fusion, makes sure that a suitable proposition
always exists. But we may then ask for a defence of this assumption; what justifies disregarding
propositions that are not raisable? The simplest answer is perhaps this. For any legitimate proposition
P, it should be possible to form its double negation ¬¬P. Given the proposed account of ground and
negation, (¬¬P)+ relates to P+ exactly so that ↑(P+)= (¬¬P)+ (similarly for (¬¬P)−). So whenever
↑P does not exist, P cannot occur within a legitimate bilateral content and may for that reason be
discarded. We can perhaps also argue for the raisability of legitimate propositions on independent
grounds. For it seems that if P is a legitimate (unilateral) proposition, then there is such a thing as
(non-factively) verifying P – if no sense can be made of the idea of P being verified, there is something
incoherent about P. But if there is such a thing as verifying P, then it seems we can ask what can be
done by verifying P. Now this question is about a way, or mode of doing something, namely the mode
of doing it by verifying P. So this mode should be taken to exist. But since this mode is just the mode
V 〈P〉, it follows that P is raisable.
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We may then establish substantive necessary and sufficient conditions for a set of
propositions Γ to ground any kind of truth-functionally complex proposition. To state
them concisely, we introduce some abbreviations. Let Γ ≤ {P1, P2, . . .} abbreviate: for
some sets Γ1, Γ2, . . . with Γ = Γ1 ∪Γ2 ∪ . . ., Γ1 ≤ P1 and Γ2 ≤ P2 and . . .. Then for
raisable propositions P and Q and any set of raisable propositions Γ:25
(< ∧): Γ < P∧Q iff Γ ≤ {P,Q}
(< ∨): Γ < P∨Q iff Γ ≤ P or Γ ≤Q or Γ ≤ {P,Q}
(< ¬¬): Γ < ¬¬P iff Γ ≤ P
(< ¬∧): Γ < ¬(P∧Q) iff Γ ≤ ¬P or Γ ≤ ¬Q or Γ ≤ {¬P, ¬Q}
(< ¬∨): Γ < ¬(P∨Q) iff Γ ≤ {¬P, ¬Q}
By the reflexivity of ≤, the introduction principles for ground can be obtained from the
right-to-left directions of these biconditionals. For example, since P ≤ P and Q ≤ Q,
it follows that P,Q ≤ {P,Q}, and hence by the right-to-left direction of (< ∧), P,Q <
P∧Q. The left-to-right directions of the biconditionals in turn correspond exactly to the
elimination rules for ground proposed by Fine (2012b: p. 63ff).26
A number of variations on the above definitions may be considered. For example, we
might not allow (unilateral) disjunctions P∨Q to be verified via P, Q, but only via P and
via Q, as well as perhaps in modes in which the latter are verified. The above results
would then still hold once we drop the third disjunct from the right-hand sides of (< ∨)
and (< ¬∧). It would also be very interesting to see exactly what logical principles
would hold on a symmetric account of negation.
What about views, like that proposed in (Correia, 2010), which impose substantive
restrictions even on, say, the principle that P< P∨Q? Can they also be accommodated
within the present framework? There is no general reason why this should not be possi-
ble. As long as the restrictions imposed can somehow be captured in terms of the modes
in which the component propositions are verified, we may simply exclude the offending
25 A proof of this result is given in the appendix.
26 The elimination rules are perhaps more controversial than the introduction rules; for instance, it might
be suggested that P∨¬P is not only grounded by the weak grounds of its true disjunct, but also by the
laws of logic, on some suitable construal of that phrase (this idea is also mentioned, but not endorsed
in (Schnieder, 2011: p. 457f)). So it may be worth noting that the elimination rules may be invalidated
in a natural way without the introduction rules thereby also becoming invalid. All we need to do is
to drop the requirement that the mode-space be constrained. (Whether and how the suggestion that
the laws of logic ground P∨¬P could be implemented within the overall framework developed here
is harder to answer, and depends strongly on how exactly that view is spelt out.) Thanks here to an
anonymous referee.
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modes from the complex propositions as defined above. We might, for example, stip-
ulate that P∨Q is verified via V 〈P〉 and V 〈Q〉 only if P 6= Q. This would ensure that
P 6< P∨P.27
Note, however, that these sorts of moves cannot be motivated in the way in which
Correia argues for his favoured restrictions on the introduction principles. For as we
saw earlier, Correia appeals to a prior standard for the individuation of ground-theoretic
content on which P and P∨ P are identified. But when ground-theoretic content is
conceived as on the present view as capturing in what modes a content is verified, then
the latter question needs to be answered independently of assumptions concerning the
identity and distinctness of the contents involved. I take this to provide some additional
support for Correia’s contention that the view of ground as satisfying the unrestricted
introduction principles targets a different notion of ground, sensitive to different features
of a sentence’s overall content, than the view on which only a restricted version of the
principles hold (cf. Correia’s 2010: pp. 256ff; 2014a: §§3, 5; 2014b: p. 36).
5.4. Structural Properties of Ground. In this section we discuss some structural prop-
erties that ground may be taken to possess, and how they may be captured within my
framework. There is in principle an unsurveyable number of such properties; my choice
in which of them to discuss has been guided in part by which look particularly natu-
ral from the perspective of my framework, and by which of them are endorsed in the
currently most well-developed view on the matter, which is that of Fine (2012c).
It is often held that ground is irreflexive in the sense that nothing helps ground itself.28
Given our definition of ground, this amounts to the claim that there is no proposition P
such that P is a member of a ground-set of some mode m ∈ P.29 Nothing we have said
27 It might also be possible to achieve the same result not by changing the definition of disjunction,
but by revising the definition of grounding, giving up on the tight connection that every mode of
verification corresponds to an instance of grounding. – Note that the wish to reject P< P∨P is not the
only possible motivation for wanting to restrict the disjunction principle that P < P∨Q; some of the
possible responses to the puzzles of ground presented in (Fine, 2010) also involve such a restriction.
With respect to these views, the same comments apply: as long as the relevant restrictions can be
captured within our framework, the views can be accommodated. Thanks to an anonymous referee
for bringing up the matter of the puzzles of ground.
28 Since this is the standard view, more interesting than listing sources for it is to give some sources where
the principle has been called into question. One context in which self-grounding has been considered
a possibility is that of the paradoxes of ground described in Fine (2010) and Krämer (2013); see in
particular (Correia, 2014b: sec. 7). Different kinds of doubts about irreflexivity are raised in Jenkins
(2011).
29 Throughout this section, by ‘content’ and ‘proposition’ I shall mean unilateral content.
TOWARDS A THEORY OF GROUND-THEORETIC CONTENT 22
so far guarantees this. Specifically, given a proposition P, nothing we have said rules
out that V maps 〈P〉 to a member of P, in which case P< P.
Call a proposition P irreflexive iff P is not an element of any sequence γ with V (γ) ∈
P. If V 〈P1, P2, . . .〉 /∈⋃{P1, P2, . . .} for any propositions P1, P2, . . ., then all propositions
are irreflexive. For irreflexive propositions, and only for them, the following principles
hold:30
Irreflexivity(<): Γ, P 6< P.
Irreflexivity(≺): P 6≺ P.
Irreflexive propositions also satisfy the following principle.31
Reverse Subsumption(≤/<): If Γ≤ P and Q≺ P for all Q ∈ Γ, then Γ< P.
This principle corresponds to a basic rule of inference in Fine’s logic; it is closely related
to the characterization of strict full ground as ‘irreversible’ weak full ground, i.e. the
equivalence of Γ < P to Γ < P and P 6 Q for any Q ∈ Γ. The right-to-left direction of
this equivalence is ensured already by our definition of≤. For suppose Γ≤ P and P 6Q
whenever Q ∈ Γ. Unless Γ < P, then from the definition of ≤ it follows immediately
that P∈ Γ. But since P P, this contradicts the assumption that P 6Q whenever Q∈ Γ.
The left-to-right direction of the equivalence holds whenever another commonly ac-
cepted principle for ground holds, namely that ground is asymmetric in the sense that if
P helps ground Q, Q does not help ground P. We may call a proposition P asymmetric iff
whenever V 〈Q1, Q2, . . .〉 ∈ P and V 〈R1, R2, . . .〉 ∈⋃{Q1, Q2, . . .}, then P is not among
R1, R2, . . . It is straightforward to show that for exactly the asymmetric propositions P:
Asymmetry(<): If Γ, Q< P, then ∆, P 6< Q.
Asymmetry(≺): If Q≺ P, then P 6≺ Q.
But now suppose Γ< P. Then, firstly, Γ≤ P. Secondly, the relationship of weak ground
is irreversible. For suppose P  Q for some Q ∈ Γ. Then either P ≺ Q or P = Q. But
since Q ≺ P, Asymmetry(≺) rules out both possibilities. So strict full ground implies
irreversible weak full ground for irreflexive and asymmetric propositions.
I wish to briefly mention two further principles of interest related to those just con-
sidered.
Redundancy(≤): If Γ, P≤ P then Γ≤ P.
30 For the first principle, assume Γ,P < P. Then Γ,P is a ground-set of some derivative mode m ∈ P,
so for some sequence of propositions γ with V (γ) = m, Γ,P is the set underlying γ . But then P is an
element of γ , contrary to our assumption. The second principle follows by the definition of ≺. The
other directions are equally straightforward.
31 Assume Γ≤ P and Q≺ P for all Q ∈ Γ. Note that P /∈ Γ, for otherwise P≺ P, contradicting irreflex-
ivity. But then neither Γ= {P} nor {P} ⊂ Γ, and therefore Γ< P.
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Reverse Subsumption(≺/=): If P Q and Q P, then P = Q.
The first one follows from irreflexivity, the second from asymmetry.32
The principles are interesting in part because they do not hold in the logic of (Fine,
2012c). To see this, let fact s be a proper part of fact t, i.e. t = t unionsq s and t 6= s. Then
consider P = {s, t} and Q = {t}. Evidently, P 6= Q. But Q ⊆ P, so on Fine’s account,
Q ≤ P, and hence Q  P. Moreover, since sunionsq t = t unionsq t = t, every fusion of verifiers of
P and Q is a verifier of Q, so we have P, Q ≤ Q, and hence P  Q. So P and Q are
a counter-example to Reverse Subsumption(≺/=), and indeed to the weaker claim that
mutual weak full ground implies identity. Moreover, they also give rise to a counter-
example to Redundancy(≤), for as we saw, P, Q ≤ Q, whereas P 6≤ Q. The differences
between Fine’s approach to weak ground and ours thus manifest themselves in signifi-
cant differences concerning the structural properties of weak ground.
It is also often maintained that ground is transitive.33 A number of different principles
may be subsumed under this heading. Relatively weak examples are that if P ≺ Q and
P ≺ R, then P ≺ R, or that if Γ < P, and P < Q, then Γ < Q. A stronger form of
transitivity may be stated as follows:
Transitivity(<): If Γ< P and ∆, P< Q, then Γ, ∆< Q.
This principle holds, for example, on the views of (Fine, 2012c: pp. 5, 22) and (Correia,
2010: p. 262).
Let us then consider what might be natural constraints of transitivity to impose on
our contents. Here is one obvious idea, corresponding to the second weak interpretation
of transitivity above. Suppose Q contains V 〈P〉, and P contains V (γ). Then it might
naturally be required that V (γ) should also be contained in Q. This would ensure that if
Γ< P, and P< Q, then Γ< Q.
But consider now the case in which Q does not contain V 〈P〉, but contains some mode
V (δ )with P an element of δ . A natural suggestion is that transitivity requires that Q also
contain V (δ γ/〈P〉) where δ γ/〈P〉 results from systematically replacing 〈P〉 in δ by γ .34
32 For the first principle, assume Γ,P≤ P for non-empty Γ. By irreflexivity, Γ,P 6< P. There remain two
cases. (i) Γ∪{P} = {P}. Then Γ = {P}, and hence Γ ≤ P. (ii) (Γ∪{P})\{P} ≤ P. If P ∈ Γ, then
Γ∪{P} = Γ and hence by assumption Γ ≤ P. If P /∈ Γ, then (Γ∪{P})\{P} = Γ and hence again,
Γ≤ P. The second principle is immediate given asymmetry and the definition .
33 Again, it may be more interesting to mention dissenters. The most influential arguments against
transitivity are perhaps those given in (Schaffer, 2012: p. 126ff). For replies, see Litland (2013);
Raven (2013); Krämer and Roski (2016).
34 We might perhaps also consider allowing the replacement of only some occurrences of 〈P〉, which
would create some additional complications because what modes can be obtained by transitivity from
a mode can then not be read off from the corresponding ground-set.
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This, however, is not sufficient for Transitivity(<). For let Γ be the set corresponding
by γ , so Γ < P. Now suppose Q contains V 〈P, R〉 with R 6= P, so P, R < Q. Now let
∆= {P, R}, and note that since ∆=∆, P<Q. So by Transitivity(<), Γ, ∆=Γ, P, R<Q.
However, the envisaged transitivity constraint on contents yields only that Q contains
V (γ_〈R〉). The ground-set of this mode is Γ, R which is distinct from Γ, P, R unless
P ∈ Γ. So there is no guarantee that Γ, P, R< Q.
The transitivity principle for ground validated by this constraint may instead be stated
thus:
Transitivity(<)*: If Γ< P and ∆< Q, then ∆Γ/P < Q.
where ∆Γ/P is (∆\{P})∪Γ if P ∈ ∆ and ∆ otherwise. If, on the other hand, we wish
to ensure the stronger transitivity principle, we may impose the following constraint: If
Q contains a mode with ground-set ∆, P, then Q contains a mode with ground-set Γ, ∆
whenever P contains a mode with ground-set Γ.35 Put in terms of corresponding via-
sequences, we might say that if Q contains V (δ ), P is an element of δ , and P contains
V (γ), then Q contains V (δ ′) whenever δ ′ may be obtained from δ by systematically
replacing 〈P〉 in δ by either γ or 〈P〉_γ . However, from an intuitive point of view,
this seems to have a weaker claim than the previous constraint to amount simply to a
principle of transitivity concerning modes of verification.
The final structural principle I wish to consider here is the following principle of
amalgamation, which is derivable in Fine’s pure logic of ground (cf. his 2012c: p. 7):
Amalgamation(<): If Γ1 < P and Γ2 < P and . . ., then Γ1∪Γ2∪ . . . < P.
Like the previous principles, it does not hold for arbitrary contents. We may say that
a content is closed iff, whenever it contains modes with ground-sets Γ1, Γ2, . . ., it also
contains some mode with ground-set Γ1 ∪Γ2 ∪ . . .. Then Amalgamation(<) holds ex-
actly for closed propositions P.
Call a proposition normal iff it is closed, irreflexive, and satisfies the strong transi-
tivity constraint. We may then report two welcome results about normal propositions.36
Firstly, normal propositions satisfy all the principles corresponding to the rules of the
pure logic of ground advocated in (Fine, 2012c: p. 5).37 Most of them have already
been stated, the remaining ones are principles of transitivity involving weak grounding
relationships:
Transitivity(≤/≤): If Γ≤ P and ∆,P≤ Q then Γ,∆≤ P
Transitivity(/≺): If P Q and Q≺ R then P≺ R
35 It is immediate that Transitivity(<) will hold exactly for the propositions satisfying this constraint.
36 The proofs are in the appendix.
37 As we have seen, however, they satisfy some additional principles as well.
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Transitivity(≺/): If P≺ Q and Q R then P≺ R
Transitivity(≺/≺): If P Q and Q R then P R
Secondly, the property of normality is preserved under our truth-functional operations.
Our understanding of conjunction, disjunction, and negation therefore coheres with a
view of ground as satisfying the normality properties in the sense that if we start with
a range of normal propositions, application of our truth-functional operations to them
will never take us to non-normal propositions.38
5.5. Ground-Theoretic Equivalence and the Individuation of Modes. We have so
far said very little about the conditions under which contents obtained by application
of truth-functional operations are identical. Closely related, but even more important
for the purposes of the theory of ground is the question under what conditions they are
ground-theoretically equivalent, where this term is understood in accordance with the
following definition:39
(≈): P is ground-theoretically equivalent to Q (P≈Q) iff
(i) for all Γ: Γ < P iff Γ <Q, and
(ii) for all ∆ and R: ∆,P< R iff ∆,Q< R.
It is easily seen that ≈ is indeed an equivalence relation.
Ground-theoretic equivalence is closely related to identity on bilateral and unilateral
contents. Evidently, the identity of bilateral contents implies their (ground-theoretic)
equivalence. Indeed, because we have defined ground on bilateral contents without
regard to negative content, two propositions will be equivalent already if they have the
same positive content. This gives us a first substantive result about equivalence. For
the DeMorgan laws are easily shown to hold for identity of positive content, and they
therefore also hold for ≈:
(DeMorgan 1): ¬(P∧Q)≈ ¬P∨¬Q
(DeMorgan 2): ¬(P∨Q)≈ ¬P∧¬Q
38 Further structural principles about ground might of course be considered, and implemented in the
form of suitable constraints on propositions. The most significant ones among them may be the
various versions of the claim that ground is well-founded. For an illuminating discussion of the
various possible interpretations of the claim, see Dixon (2016). See Litland (2016a) for an argument
for an instance of non-well-founded grounding.
39 I borrow the term from (Fine, 2012b: pp. 63, 67), who does not explicitly define it but seems to use it
in at least roughly the same sense.
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Assuming irreflexivity, the relation between identity of positive content and ≈ turns out
to be even tighter: ≈ is equivalent to identity of positive content.40
(≈-Equivalence): P≈Q iff P+ = Q+
Using this fact, it is easy to show that ≈ is preserved under ∧, ∨, and ¬¬:
(≈ ∧): If P≈Q then P∧R≈Q∧R and R∧P≈ R∧Q
(≈ ∨): If P≈Q then P∨R≈Q∨R and R∨P≈ R∨Q
(≈ ¬¬): If P≈Q then ¬¬P≈ ¬¬Q
However, it can be shown that ≈ is not preserved under ¬. The DeMorgan equivalents
constitute a relatively simple counter-example. To get an idea why, note that although
¬(P∧Q) ≈ ¬P∨¬Q, negating the right-hand side yields ¬(¬P∨¬Q), which by the
other DeMorgan law is equivalent to ¬¬P∧¬¬Q. This, however, is not in general
equivalent to ¬¬(P∧Q), that is, the negation of the left-hand side of the original equiv-
alence. For while the former is always grounded by ¬¬P, ¬¬Q, this is not in general
true of ¬¬(P∧Q).
We should also like to know under what conditions the various kinds of truth-functionally
complex propositions are equivalent to one another. The answer to this depends on the
general conditions under which V is taken to map two sequences to the same mode. So
far, we have committed to the thesis that given any sequence of propositions, there is at
most one mode of verifying via that sequence. So any mode which is a mode of verify-
ing via some sequence of propositions is uniquely identified by that sequence. This puts
an upper bound on the fineness of grain with which we may individuate modes: they are
at most as finely individuated as the corresponding sequences of propositions.
We have also assumed that two sequences correspond to the same mode only if the
sequences correspond to the same set, i.e. if the same propositions belong to both. This
puts a lower bound on the fineness of grain with which we may individuate modes:
they are at least as finely individuated as the sets determined by their corresponding se-
quences. There is at least one natural intermediate option, which is to abstract from the
order of the propositions in a sequence corresponding to a mode, but not from repeti-
tions. On this view, modes are exactly as finely individuated as the multi-sets determined
by their corresponding sequences.
We shall say that the via-function V is sequential iff: V (γ) =V (δ ) just in case γ = δ ;
semi-extensional iff: V (γ) = V (δ ) just in case γ and δ determine the same multi-set;
and extensional iff: V (γ) = V (δ ) just in case γ and δ determine the same set. It is
40 For assume P≈Q. Note that P< ¬¬P, so Q< ¬¬P, so Q≤ P, and hence either Q< P or Q+ = P+.
So if Q+ 6= P+, it follows that Q< P. By P≈Q, we may infer P< P, contrary to the assumption of
irreflexivity.
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beyond the scope of this paper to determine, in terms of the relationships between the
component propositions, the exact conditions under which truth-functionally complex
propositions will be equivalent under each of these views. I shall here confine myself to
some observations concerning the most distinctive features of the three approaches.
If V is sequential, then it will not in general be the case that P∧Q ≈ Q∧ P, or
that P∨Q ≈ Q∨P. For suppose P and Q are fundamental propositions, i.e. proposi-
tions whose positive components contain no derivative modes, and suppose P+ 6= Q+.
For the case of conjunction, note that P+ ∧Q+ and Q+ ∧P+ will then each include
exactly one derivative mode, namely V 〈P+,Q+〉 and V 〈Q+,P+〉, respectively. Since
P 6= Q, 〈P,Q〉 6= 〈Q,P〉. By sequentiality of V , V 〈P+,Q+〉 6= V 〈Q+,P+〉, and hence
P+ ∧Q+ 6= Q+ ∧P+, so by (≈-Equivalence), P∧Q 6≈ Q∧P. Similar considerations
establish the point for disjunction. However, if V is semi-extensional or extensional,
these equivalences will hold. We consider only conjunction. Every mode in P+∧Q+
may be written V (γ_δ ) where V (γ) ∈ P+ and V (δ ) ∈Q+. But then Q+∧P+ includes
V (δ_γ), and since γ_δ and δ_γ determine the same multi-set, and therefore the same
set, the modes are identical.
A distinctive feature of the extensional approach is that it yields some general equiv-
alences between the values of different truth-functional operations. In particular, for
any closed P, we have P∧P ≈ P∨P ≈ ¬¬P. Indeed, the contents in question will be
fully identical.41 Now call a bilateral proposition conjunctive, disjunctive, or negative,
according as it is the value of the operation of conjunction, disjunction, or negation on
bilateral contents. Our observation then shows that on the extensional approach, there
is no clear divide among the propositions that are conjunctive, disjunctive, or negative,
but that these categories overlap. This is significant because it calls into question at least
one interpretation of Correia’s claim that the acceptance of the unrestricted introduction
principles for ground commits us to a conceptual, or representational conception of the
relata of ground. For one good sense we could give to the notion of a representational
conception of content is that it applies just in case contents are individuated in terms
of the concepts invoked in expressing them. But this would appear to imply, at the
very least, that there is a mutually exclusive division into conjunctive and disjunctive
contents.
Another striking feature of the extensional approach is that, assuming a modest form
of the transitivity of ground, it allows us to characterize binary ground, weak or strict,
purely in terms of disjunction, equivalence, and inequivalence. For P<Q is equivalent
41 The crucial observation is that if modes are extensional, the operation of fusion on the modes is
idempotent, i.e. munionsqm = m. This renders the operations on closed contents of unionsq and + idempotent,
from which the above identities follow straightforwardly.
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to P ≤ Q and P 6≈ Q, and the condition that P ≤ Q now turns out equivalent to the
condition that P∨Q ≈ Q∨Q. To see this, note that the extensional approach renders
equivalent the propositions P,Q iff they have the same strict full grounds, assuming
they have some strict full grounds at all. Then given transitivity, any strict full ground
of P is a strict full ground of Q if P≤Q, and hence the strict full grounds of P∨Q are
exactly the same as the strict full grounds of Q∨Q. This is significant in part because
the very same equivalence holds on the Finean truthmaker account of ground above, and
in the logic of Correia (2010). Only on the latter views, the equivalence can be further
simplified, owing to the identification of a proposition with its self-disjunction. So we
see that on the extensional approach to modes, the view of ground that emerges stays
remarkably close to the so-called worldly accounts.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have proposed a novel answer to the question what features of a sen-
tence’s content the notion of ground tracks: it tracks in what modes a content is verified.
Roughly speaking, some truths Γ (strictly fully) ground a truth Q just in case verifying
Γ is a mode of verifying Q. Based on this idea, I have presented an elementary formal
theory of ground-theoretic content, on which a content encodes the information in what
modes it may be verified or falsified. This theory, I maintain, is very well suited to serve
as a framework within which a number of alternative views of ground may be articu-
lated and examined. By way of defending this claim, I have presented a very natural and
attractive account of the truth-functional operations and their interaction with ground,
and I have shown how various possible views of the structural features of ground can
be accommodated within my framework. Finally, I have described three views of the
identity conditions of modes and some of their implications for the logic of ground,
highlighting some surprising and intriguing features of the most coarse-grained of the
views.
A natural next step is now to try and determine the exact pure and propositional logics
of ground corresponding to a range of competing views of ground that may be imple-
mented in the framework. In addition, various kinds of extensions of the framework
may be attempted, for example by treating quantification, modal operators, and perhaps
iterated ground, i.e. the grounds of truths of the form Γ < P. Already in its present
form, however, the framework represents a significant step forward on the way towards
a satisfactory and comprehensive theory of ground, and of ground-theoretic content.
APPENDIX
We begin with the definition of a mode-space.
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Definition (Mode-Spaces) A mode-space is a pair 〈M,V 〉 such that
(1) M is non-empty
(2) V is a non-empty, partial function taking sequences of non-empty subsets of M
into members of M
(3) the domain of V is closed under non-empty subsequences and countable con-
catenations of sequences
(4) V (γ1_γ2_ . . .) =V (δ_1 δ
_
2 . . .) whenever V (γ1) =V (δ1),V (γ2) =V (δ2), . . .
Given a fixed mode-space 〈M,V 〉, we call a mode any member of M. Any mode which
is the value of V for some argument is called derivative, every other mode is called
fundamental. We write MD (MF ) for the set of derivative (fundamental) modes. Any
subset of M will be called a content, and their set will be denoted by C . The contents
containing only derivative modes will themselves be called derivative, and the other
contents will be called fundamental. We write C D (C F ) for the set of derivative (funda-
mental) contents. Any sequence for which V is defined is called a via-sequence. Since
the domain of V is closed under non-empty subsequences, for any content P that is an
element of some via-sequence, there is also the via-sequence 〈P〉 corresponding to the
mode of verifying via P. We shall call any such content raisable and denote their set
by R. We call a ground-set of a derivative mode m any set of contents that underlies a
content-sequence γ with V (γ) = m.
We say that a derivative mode m is a fusion of the sequence of derivative modes
〈m1, m2, . . .〉 iff there are via-sequences γ1, γ2, . . . such that V (γ1)=m1, V (γ2)=m2, . . .,
and m =V (γ1_γ2_ . . .).42 By the third constraint on mode-spaces, fusions will always
exist, and by the fourth constraint, they will be unique. For the sequence of derivative
modes 〈m1, m2, . . .〉, we write its fusion as ⊔〈m1, m2, . . .〉 and also as m1unionsqm2unionsq . . .. We
note a first central lemma (the proof is elementary):
Lemma 1. If Γ1, Γ2, . . . are ground-sets of m1, m2, . . ., respectively, then Γ1∪Γ2∪ . . .
is a ground-set of m1unionsqm2unionsq . . .
For convenience, we repeat the definitions of the grounding relationships and of the
truthfunctions.
Definition Let Γ⊆ C and P ∈ C . Then
Γ< P :↔ for some mode m ∈ P, Γ is a ground-set of m
Q≺ P :↔ for some m ∈ P, Q is a member of a ground-set of m
Γ≤ P :↔ Γ= {P} or Γ< P or Γ\{P}< P
42 Note that somewhat unusally, our operation of fusion applies to sequences of modes and is thereby
potentially sensitive to order and repetition of the modes being fused.
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Q P :↔ Q = P or Q≺ P
As before, we write Γ < {P1, P2, . . .} to abbreviate that for some Γ1, Γ2, . . ., Γ = Γ1∪
Γ2∪ . . . and Γ1 < P1, Γ2 < P2, . . ., and similarly for the case of Γ≤ {P1, P2, . . .}.
Definition For P,Q ∈ C D:
PunionsqQ := {munionsqn : m ∈ P and n ∈ Q}
P+Q := (P∪Q)∪ (PunionsqQ)
Definition For P,Q ∈R:
↑P := {V 〈P〉} if P∩MD is empty, {V 〈P〉}+(P∩MD) otherwise
P∧Q := ↑P unionsq ↑Q
P∨Q := ↑P + ↑Q
We shall mainly be interested in mode-spaces in which the set of raisable contents is
closed under these operations.
Definition A mode-space is called complete iff P∧Q ∈ R, P∨Q ∈ R, and ↑P ∈ R
whenever P,Q ∈R.
Lemma 2. (Introduction Lemma)
In any complete mode-space, for Γ⊆R and P, Q ∈R:
(1) If Γ≤ P, then Γ<↑P.
(2) If Γ< {P, Q}, then Γ< PunionsqQ.
(3) If Γ< P or Γ< Q or Γ< {P, Q}, then Γ< P+Q
(4) If Γ≤ {P, Q}, then Γ< P∧Q
(5) If Γ≤ P or Γ≤ Q or Γ< {P, Q}, then Γ< P∨Q.
Proof. For 1: Suppose Γ≤ P. Then either (i) Γ= {P}, or (ii) Γ< P, or (iii) Γ\{P}< P.
Suppose (i). By definition of ↑, V 〈P〉 ∈↑P. Since {P} is the set underlying 〈P〉, it is
a ground-set of V 〈P〉, so Γ < P. Suppose (ii). Then Γ is a ground-set of some mode
m∈ P. But then by definition of ↑it follows that m∈↑P, and hence Γ< P. Suppose (iii).
Then for some m ∈ P, Γ\{P} is a ground-set of m. But then by definition of ↑it follows
that munionsqV 〈P〉 ∈↑P. By lemma 1, Γ\{P}∪{P}= Γ is a ground-set of munionsqV 〈P〉, hence
Γ< P.
For 2: Suppose Γ < {P, Q}. Let ΓP < P and ΓQ < Q with ΓP ∪ΓQ = Γ. Then ΓP
is a ground-set of some mode mP ∈ P and ΓQ is a ground-set of some mode mQ ∈ Q.
By definition of unionsq, mPunionsqmQ ∈ PunionsqQ, and by lemma 1, ΓP∪ΓQ = Γ is a ground-set of
mPunionsqmQ, hence Γ< PunionsqQ.
For 3: Suppose Γ < P. Then there is a mode m ∈ P of which Γ is a ground-set. By
definition of +, the same mode is included in P+Q, hence Γ< P+Q. Suppose Γ<Q.
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Then by the same reasoning, Γ< P+Q. Finally, suppose Γ< {P, Q}. Then by part 2.,
Γ< PunionsqQ, and hence by definition of +, Γ< P+Q.
For 4: Suppose Γ ≤ {P, Q}. Let ΓP ≤ P and ΓQ ≤ Q with ΓP∪ΓQ = Γ. By part 1.,
ΓP <↑P and ΓQ <↑Q, hence Γ< {↑P, ↑Q}, and by part 2., Γ< P∧Q.
For 5: If Γ ≤ P or Γ ≤ Q, then by part 2., Γ <↑P or Γ <↑Q. If Γ ≤ {P, Q}, then by
the reasoning in part 4., Γ< {↑P, ↑Q}. So by part 3., Γ< P∨Q. 
Definition A mode-space is called constrained iff V (γ)=V (δ ) only if the same ground-
set corresponds to γ and δ .
In a constrained mode-space, every derivative mode m corresponds to a unique ground-
set, which we denote by |m|.
Lemma 3. (Elimination Lemma)
In any constrained and complete mode-space, for Γ⊆R and P,Q ∈R:
(1) If Γ<↑P, then Γ≤ P
(2) If Γ< PunionsqQ, then Γ< {P, Q}
(3) If Γ< P+Q, then Γ< P or Γ< Q or Γ< {P, Q}
(4) If Γ< P∧Q, then Γ≤ {P, Q}
(5) If Γ< P∨Q, then Γ≤ P or Γ≤ Q or Γ≤ {P, Q}
Proof. For 1: Suppose Γ <↑P. Let m ∈↑P with Γ = |m|. By definition of ↑, there
are three cases. (i) m ∈ P∩MD. Then Γ < P and hence Γ ≤ P. (ii) m = V 〈P〉. Then
Γ= |V 〈P〉|= {P}, so again Γ≤ P. (iii) m=V 〈P〉unionsqn for some n∈ P∩MD. Since n∈ P,
|n|< P. By lemma 1, Γ= |n|∪{P}. Then either |n|= Γ or |n|= Γ\{P}, so either Γ< P
or Γ\{P}< P, and hence Γ≤ P.
For 2: Suppose Γ < PunionsqQ. Let |m| = Γ and m ∈ PunionsqQ. Then m = mP unionsqmQ for
some mP ∈ P and mQ ∈ Q. So |mP|< P and |mQ|< Q. But Γ= |mP| ∪ |mQ, and hence
Γ< {P, Q}.
For 3: Suppose Γ< P+Q. Then it is immediate from the definition of + that Γ< P
or Γ< Q or Γ< PunionsqQ, which by part 2. implies Γ< {P, Q}.
For 4: Suppose Γ < P∧Q. By part 2., Γ < {↑P, ↑Q}. So let ΓP <↑P and ΓQ <↑Q
with Γ= ΓP∪ΓQ. By part 1., ΓP ≤ P and ΓQ ≤ Q, hence Γ≤ {P, Q}.
For 5: Suppose Γ< P∨Q. By part 3., there are three cases. (i) Γ<↑P. Then by part
1., Γ ≤ P. (ii) Γ <↑Q. Then by part 1. again, Γ ≤ Q. (iii) Γ ≤ {↑P, ↑Q}. Then by the
reasoning in part 4., Γ≤ {P, Q}. 
We move on to the case of bilateral contents. We define the truth-functional operations
on bilateral contents as well as the notion of ground-theoretic equivalence (≈).
Definition For P,Q ∈R×R:




Definition For P,Q ∈R×R:
P≈Q :↔ for all Γ: Γ < P iff Γ <Q, and for all ∆ and R: ∆,P< R iff ∆,Q< R.
Recall that ground between bilateral contents is defined simply as ground between the
positive components. As a result, bilateral contents will be ground-theoretically equiv-
alent (written ≈) provided their positive components are the same.
Lemma 4. (DeMorgan) For P,Q ∈R×R:
(1) ¬(P∧Q)≈ ¬P∨¬Q
(2) ¬(P∨Q)≈ ¬P∧¬Q
Proof. By application of the definitions.
For 1: (¬(P∧Q))+ = (P∧Q)− = P−∨Q− = (¬P)+∨ (¬Q)+ = (¬P∨¬Q)+
For 2: (¬(P∨Q))+ = (P∨Q)− = P−∧Q− = (¬P)+∧ (¬Q)+ = (¬P∧¬Q)+ 
As an immediate consequence of the definition of ground on bilateral contents and the
previous lemmata, we obtain
Theorem 5. (Truthfunctions and Ground, Introduction)
In any complete mode-space, for Γ ⊆R×R and P,Q ∈R×R:
(1) If Γ ≤ {P,Q}, then Γ < P∧Q
(2) If Γ ≤ P or Γ ≤Q or Γ < {P,Q}, then Γ < P∨Q.
(3) If Γ ≤ P, then Γ < ¬¬P
(4) If Γ ≤ ¬P or Γ ≤ ¬Q or Γ ≤ {¬P, ¬Q}, then Γ < ¬(P∧Q)
(5) If Γ ≤ {¬P, ¬Q}, then Γ < ¬(P∨Q)
Theorem 6. (Truthfunctions and Ground, Elimination)
In any complete and constrained mode-space, for Γ ⊆R×R and P,Q ∈R×R:
(1) If Γ < P∧Q, then Γ ≤ {P,Q}
(2) If Γ < P∨Q, then Γ ≤ P or Γ ≤Q or Γ ≤ {P,Q}
(3) If Γ < ¬¬P, then Γ ≤ P
(4) If Γ < ¬(P∧Q), then Γ ≤ ¬P or Γ ≤ ¬Q or Γ≤ {¬P, ¬Q}
(5) If Γ < ¬(P∨Q), then Γ ≤ {¬P, ¬Q}
We turn now to the structural properties of ground.
Definition A proposition P is
• irreflexive iff: P does not occur in γ whenever V (γ) ∈ P,
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• closed iff: P contains a mode with ground-set Γ1∪Γ2∪ . . . whenever P contains
modes with ground-sets Γ1, Γ2, . . .,
• transitive iff: P includes a mode with ground-set Γ, ∆ whenever P includes a
mode with ground-set ∆, Q and Q includes a mode with ground-set Γ.
• normal iff: irreflexive, closed, and transitive.
Theorem 7. (Structural Principles for Normal Propositions) In any constrained mode-
space, for normal propositions P, P1, P2, . . . , Q, R and sets of normal propositions Γ, Γ1, Γ2, . . . , ∆:
(1) P 6≺ P
(2) If Γ1 < P, Γ2 < P, . . . , then Γ1, Γ2, . . . < P.
(3) If Γ≤ P and Q≺ P for all Q ∈ Γ, then Γ< P.
(4) If Γ, P≤ P, then Γ≤ P.
(5) If Γ1 ≤ P, Γ2 ≤ P, . . ., then Γ1∪Γ2∪ . . .≤ P.
(6) If Γ< P and ∆, P< Q, then Γ, ∆< Q.
(7) If Γ1 ≤ P1, Γ2 ≤ P2, . . . , and P1, P2, . . .≤ Q then Γ1, Γ2, . . .≤ Q
(8) If P Q and Q≺ R then P≺ R
(9) If P≺ Q and Q R then P≺ R
(10) If P Q and Q R then P R
Proof. 1.–4., and 6. were established in section 5.4 above.
For 5., suppose Γ1 ≤ P, Γ2 ≤ P, . . . Consider all the Γi which are distinct from {P}.
By definition of≤ and 1., Γi\{P}< P for any such Γi. If there are any such Γi, let Γ′ be
the result of removing P from their union. By 2., Γ′< P, so Γ1∪Γ2∪ . . .= Γ′∪{P}≤ P.
If there are no such Γi, then Γ1∪Γ2∪ . . .= {P} ≤ P.
For 7., suppose Γ1 ≤ P1, Γ2 ≤ P2, . . . , and P1, P2, . . . ≤ Q. We confine ourselves to
showing that Γ1 ∪{P2, . . .} ≤ Q follows. By applying the same reasoning repeatedly
and making use of the reflexivity of ≤, we may establish the desired conclusion. Now
either (a) Γ1 = {P1}, or (b) Γ1 < P1, or (c) {P1} ⊂ Γ1 and Γ1\{P1}< P1. If (a), then our
intended result Γ1∪{P2, . . .} ≤ Q follows immediately. Suppose that (b). Then if (b1)
P1 = Q, we have Γ1 < Q and hence Γ1 ≤ Q. Moreover, by 4., we have {P2, . . .} ≤ Q.
So by 5., Γ1 ∪{P2, . . .} ≤ Q follows. But if (b2) P1 6= Q, then P1 ∈ {P1, P2, . . .}\{Q}
and {P1, P2, . . .}\{Q} < Q, so by 6., Γ1 ∪{P2, . . .}\{Q} < Q, hence Γ1 ∪{P2, . . .} ≤
Q. Suppose finally that (c). Then if (c1) P1 = Q, Γ1 ≤ Q, and so Γ1 ∪{P2, . . .} ≤ Q
follows as in case (b1). But if (c2) P1 6= Q, then by similar reasoning as in case (b2),
Γ1\{P1}∪{P1, P2, . . .}= Γ1∪{P2, . . .} ≤ Q.
For 8., suppose P  Q and Q ≺ R. If P = Q, then P ≺ R follows immediately. So
suppose P 6=Q, and hence P≺Q. Let m ∈Q be such that P ∈ |m|, and let n ∈ R be such
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that Q ∈ |n|. Then |m| ∪ {P} < Q and |n| ∪ {Q} < R, so by 6., |n| ∪ |m| ∪ {P} < R, so
P≺ R.
For 9., suppose P ≺ Q and Q  R. If Q = R, then P ≺ R follows immediately. So
suppose Q 6= R, and hence Q≺ R. Then by the same reasoning as before, P≺ R.
For 10., suppose P  Q and Q  R. If either P ≺ Q or Q ≺ R, then it follows by the
previous results that P ≺ R, and hence P  R. If neither P ≺ Q nor Q ≺ R, then P = Q
and Q = R, hence P = R, and thus again P R. 
Together with the Subsumption principles and the Identity principle P ≤ P for weak
ground established in 5.2, parts 1., 3., 7.-10. correspond to the basic rules of the logic
proposed in (Fine, 2012c), which is thereby shown to be sound with respect to the class
of normal propositions in a constrained mode-space.
We call a bilateral content irreflexive, closed, transitive, or normal, just in case its
positive component has the relevant property. We wish then to show that any truth-
functional combinations of normal propositions are themselves normal. By the defini-
tions of the truth-functional operations, it suffices to show that for unilateral contents,
normality is preserved under ∧,∨, and ↑.
Theorem 8. For P, Q ∈R, in some constrained mode-space:
If P and Q are normal, then so are P∧Q, P∨Q, and ↑P.
Proof. By reducing failures for P∧Q, P∨Q, ↑P of the characteristic principles of ir-
reflexivity, amalgamation, and transitivity (1., 2., and 6. in theorem 7) to failures of the
corresponding principles for P or Q. We give the proof for P∧Q; the other cases may
be established by parallel means.
For irreflexivity, suppose that P∧Q ≺ P∧Q. Then for some Γ: Γ, P∧Q < P∧Q.
Then by the Elimination Lemma, Γ, P∧Q ≤ {P, Q}, and hence either (i) P∧Q  P or
(ii) P∧Q  Q. Suppose (i). Then since P ≺ P∧Q, it follows by transitivity of P that
P≺ P, in contradiction to P’s irreflexivity.
For amalgamation, suppose that Γ1 < P∧Q, Γ2 < P∧Q, . . . . For each Γi: Γi ≤
{P, Q}. So let ΓiP ≤ P and ΓiQ ≤ Q with Γi = ΓiP ∪ΓiQ for all i. Then by weak ground
amalgamation for P and Q, Γ1P, Γ2P, . . . ≤ P, and Γ1Q, Γ2Q, . . . ≤ Q, so Γ1, Γ2, . . . ≤
{P, Q}, and hence Γ1, Γ2, . . . < P∧Q.
For transitivity, suppose that ∆, R < P∧Q and Γ < R. Then ∆, R ≤ {P, Q}. So we
may write ∆, R as the union of weak full grounds of respectively P and Q. R will be a
member of at least one of these. By replacing R with Γ, using the transitivity of P and
Q, we may infer Γ, ∆< {P, Q}, and hence Γ, ∆< P∧Q. 
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